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HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER
JANA SINGER*
Most pundits and academic commentators have viewed the
Hamdan decision as primarily about executive power. These commentators have emphasized the Court’s forceful rejection of the Bush Administration’s claims of broad inherent executive authority and the
Court’s reaffirmation of Congress’s central role in formulating national security policy.1 Viewed from this perspective, the Hamdan decision is a relatively straightforward extension of the Court’s seminal
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer2 and, in particular, of
the tripartite framework articulated by Justice Jackson in that case for
assessing the constitutionality of executive actions.3 Because the President was acting without congressional authorization when he created
Hamdan’s military commission, and because Congress, in enacting
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),4 had promulgated an
alternative and comprehensive system of military courts, the President’s power was at its lowest ebb.5
On this view, the primary constitutional problem in Hamdan was
that the Executive had acted unilaterally in an area where the Constitution required the involvement—or at least the acquiescence—of
both political branches. The solution to this constitutional deficiency
is for the President to return to Congress to obtain the authorization
Copyright  2007 by Jana Singer.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Comment: Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 71 (2006) (claiming that
Hamdan “stands for two central ideas: (1) the President cannot set aside or creatively interpret laws of Congress under claims of ‘inherent authority,’ and (2) treaties ratified by the
Senate constrain the exercise of executive power, and the President does not have unfettered ability to interpret such treaties as he chooses”); Posting of Walter Dellinger, http://
www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825 (June 29, 2006, 17:59 EST) (asserting that the
Hamdan majority rejected the “astonishingly broad category” of executive power asserted
by the Bush Administration).
2. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). For a more extensive discussion of the
Youngstown decision, see Gordon G. Young, Youngstown, Hamdan, and “Inherent” Emergency
Presidential Policymaking Powers, 66 MD. L. REV. 787 (2007).
4. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000).
5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800–01 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part).
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that the Hamdan Court found lacking.6 Indeed, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion is explicit on this point:
The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single
ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a “blank
check.” Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at
issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning
to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.7
The President has now done exactly what Justice Breyer suggested. With the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA),8 Congress appears to have given the President something very
close to the “blank check” to which Justice Breyer refers.9 Congress
also appears to have acceded to the President’s desire to insulate the
military commission system from meaningful judicial scrutiny.10 If the
Court’s decision in Hamdan rests exclusively on the constitutionally
mandated relationship between Congress and the President, then
these developments should fully satisfy the Court. If, on the other
hand, the Hamdan decision also represents an assertion of judicial au6. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 179–80 (2006) (asserting
that “[t]he non-constitutional basis for the Hamdan decision means that Congress may
reinstate pre-Hamdan military commissions by simply passing a statute that more explicitly
approves them”).
7. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
8. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
9. The military commissions authorized by Congress differ in some ways from those
created by President Bush. For example, President Bush’s tribunals allowed the commission to exclude defendants from their own trials, while the system authorized by Congress
forbids such action. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2608. The system authorized by Congress also
contains a stronger prohibition than President Bush’s tribunals on the use of testimony
obtained by the torture of a witness. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2607. Moreover, the MCA codifies
a defendant’s right to “examine and respond to evidence,” id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2608, and it
grants more expansive discovery rights than the President’s tribunals. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at
2614. See also Katyal, supra note 1, at 97–98 (comparing differences between the military
commission structures).
10. On December 13, 2006, Judge James Robertson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that the MCA precluded Salim Hamdan from continuing to
challenge his detention in federal court. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19
(D.D.C. 2006). Robertson, who granted Hamdan’s original habeas petition in November
2004, ruled that the MCA reflected clear congressional intent to prevent noncitizen detainees from invoking the federal habeas statute. Id. at 11–12. Robertson also ruled that
Hamdan could not bring a habeas challenge directly under the Constitution because
noncitizens at Guantanamo did not meet “the geographical and volitional predicates necessary to claim [the] right.” Id. at 18; see Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.)
(holding that MCA deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas claims brought
by noncitizen detainees held at Guantanamo Bay), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007); see
also Neal A. Lewis, Judge Sets Back Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at A32.
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thority, the Court is likely to view the MCA with considerably more
skepticism.11
My reading of the Hamdan decision—particularly when combined with the Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld12—suggests
that the Court will follow the latter path. In other words, I believe that
the majority’s decision in Hamdan says as much about judicial authority as it does about the respective roles of Congress and the President
in national security matters. At least where national security policy
implicates issues of individual liberty, Hamdan suggests that the Supreme Court views the federal judiciary as an indispensable player,
not merely a passive onlooker, or even a neutral umpire. Articulating
the contours of this judicial role is likely to take the Court into uncharted territory and raise difficult separation of powers issues that go
well beyond those addressed in Youngstown.
Several aspects of the Hamdan decision support this more expansive reading. First, it is notable that the Court even reached the merits
of Hamdan’s constitutional claims. As some commentators have
noted, there were a number of ways that the Court could easily have
avoided addressing the merits.13 The fact that the Hamdan Court did
not avail itself of any of these avoidance mechanisms suggests that it
may be wary of political compromises crafted by the other two
branches that minimize the role of the federal courts.
First, the Court could have avoided the merits by interpreting the
exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (DTA)14 to apply to pending cases, such as Hamdan’s appeal.
The language of the DTA was less than clear on this point. Indeed,
there was strong evidence that Congress had deliberately punted on
this issue and had left the question open for judicial determination.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, there were a number of statutory interpretation canons and precedents that seemed to
favor the government’s position that the jurisdiction-stripping provi11. Indeed, there is evidence that at least one member of Congress who voted for the
MCA is expecting judicial skepticism. See Editorial, Careless Congress, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2006, at A28 (noting that Senator Arlen Specter justified his vote in favor of the MCA,
despite doubts about its constitutionality, because the Supreme Court would clean up any
constitutional infirmities on appeal); Editorial, Profiles in Cowardice, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2006, at B6 (same).
12. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
13. See Panel Discussion on the Supreme Court Decision in the Case of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld at Georgetown University Law Center 4–5 (June 30, 2006), available at http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/hamdanTranscript.pdf [hereinafter Hamdan
Panel Discussion] (remarks of Mark Tushnet).
14. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1).
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sions of the DTA applied to pending cases, such as Hamdan’s.15 To
be sure, there were also competing canons and precedents, which the
majority discussed at length, but my point is simply that the majority’s
holding in favor of jurisdiction was far from self-evident.
The basis for the Court’s jurisdictional holding may also be significant. As Professor Burt Neuborne has pointed out, the Hamdan majority chose not to rest its jurisdictional holding on the narrow, but
well-established canon of construction requiring an “unmistakably
clear” congressional statement in order to eliminate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a pending appeal.16 “Instead, the majority
chose the more difficult path of construing the complex statute as
retaining jurisdiction over all pending Guantanamo cases without the
tailwind of the clear statement canon.”17 The import of this doctrinal
choice was to preserve federal jurisdiction (at least temporarily) over
several hundred habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees
then pending in the lower federal courts.18
The majority’s reading of the legislative history of the DTA is similarly open to dispute. Indeed, as Justice Scalia acerbically pointed
out, much of that legislative history seemed to have been manufactured with an eye toward this very litigation.19 If Justice Scalia is correct, then he made a valid point when he chided the majority for
ignoring President Bush’s signing statement, which quite explicitly set
forth the President’s understanding that the DTA ousted jurisdiction
over pending cases.
So, at best, the jurisdictional question was a close one. Of course,
had the Court interpreted the DTA to withdraw habeas jurisdiction
over pending cases, it would have had to address the question of
15. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2810–12 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, the majority acknowledged that the government’s position “is not entirely without
support in our precedents.” Id. at 2764 (majority opinion).
16. Id. at 2763–64; see Burt Neuborne, Spheres of Justice: Who Decides?, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1090, 1098–99 (2006).
17. Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1099.
18. Id. Whether the MCA eliminates federal jurisdiction over these cases is currently
being litigated. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d sub nom.
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007). In
Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit in a 2-1 decision held that the MCA eliminated federal court
jurisdiction over these pending habeas petitions and that Congress’s doing so did not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988–94; see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
19. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2815–17 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see id. at 2767 n.10 (majority opinion) (discussing conflicting statements made by DTA’s congressional cosponsors).
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whether such a withdrawal was constitutional—one of the precise
questions posed by the MCA.20
Even if the DTA did not withdraw jurisdiction, there were a number of grounds on which the Court could have justified abstaining
from hearing the merits of Hamdan’s appeal, at least until after the
military tribunal had reached a decision. Both the majority and Justice Scalia’s dissent discussed at length the Court’s holding in Schlesinger v. Councilman,21 on which the government based its argument
“that civilian courts should await the final outcome of ongoing military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceedings.”22 The majority identified two comity concerns that justified
abstention in Councilman—the need to respect military discipline and
the deference owed to an integrated system of military courts and review procedures—but concluded that neither justification applied to
Hamdan’s case.23 Justice Scalia contended that both justifications applied and that the additional important consideration “of interbranch
comity at the federal level” weighed heavily in favor of abstention.24
Again, my purpose is not to argue that the abstention doctrine clearly
dictated one result or the other, but instead to emphasize that the
jurisprudence was unclear and that abstention was another “off ramp”
that the Court could have taken to avoid reaching the merits, had it
been so inclined.
Taking one of those off ramps would have been consistent with
the Court’s reluctance in other post-Youngstown cases to override presidential decisionmaking in foreign affairs, either by deferring to the
Executive’s interpretation of statutes or by declining to reach the merits of separation of powers challenges to executive actions.25 The fact
20. In his Hamdan dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the abolition of jurisdiction over
pending habeas corpus petitions, including Hamdan’s appeal, would not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus because Congress had established an alternative
method of judicial review in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 2818–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
D.C. Circuit recently found that the detainees were not eligible for Suspension Clause
protections. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988–94.
21. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
22. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 12, Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184)).
23. Id. at 2770–71.
24. Id. at 2819–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance
of courts “to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs”); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that “in war powers cases, the passive
virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely”); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra
Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1313–17 (1988) (discussing the Court’s use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President’s authority in cases involving foreign
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that the Court did not follow the cautious approach that it has taken
in previous foreign affairs disputes indicates that the Court not only
wanted to recalibrate the balance between Congress and the Executive, but also that the Court wanted to establish itself as an important
player in future national security disputes—at least where those disputes involve claims of individual liberty.26
The second aspect of Hamdan that supports this more courtfocused reading is the way the Court addressed the merits of
Hamdan’s claims—in particular, the fact that the majority based its
decision, in part, on Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
which the Court found had been incorporated into the UCMJ.27
What is significant about this is that the Court did not need to invoke
Common Article 3 in order to invalidate the military commissions.
Instead, the Court could have relied exclusively on the so-called “uniformity requirement” contained in the UCMJ—the requirement that
the procedures employed by military commissions mirror the procedures used in courts-martial proceedings unless the Executive demonstrates that deviations from uniformity are necessary—a showing that
the Executive had failed to make.
Instead of stopping there, however, the five-Justice majority went
on to hold that the military commission procedures also violated Common Article 3’s requirement that detainees be tried “by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”28 To reach this conclusion, the Court had to find not only that the UCMJ incorporated the
Geneva Conventions but that Common Article 3 applied to the conflict with al Qaeda—a position that the government vigorously opposed and that the court of appeals had rejected.29 Moreover, the
Court construed the phrase “regularly constituted courts” in Common
affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court’s Noninterference with the Guardians of National
Security, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1122, 1124–38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s
general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies
and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427,
433–34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid
judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).
26. See Adam Liptak, The Court Enters The War, Loudly, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 4, at 1.
27. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 (concluding that “the military commission convened
to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both
the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions”).
28. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
29. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2795–97, 2798 (2006).
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Article 3 to include only those tribunals that complied with the practicability and uniformity requirements of the UCMJ.30 In this way, the
majority linked its interpretation of Common Article 3 to its interpretation of domestic law.
As international law scholars were quick to suggest, the majority’s
holding that Common Article 3 applies to the conflict with al Qaeda
(and hence our treatment of persons captured as a result of that conflict) has implications that go far beyond the illegality of the military
commissions created by President Bush.31 For example, another provision of Common Article 3 prohibits the “torture” of prisoners,32 and
yet another provision prohibits the “humiliating and degrading treatment” of prisoners.33 And, at the time Hamdan was decided, the War
Crimes Act of 1996 made violations of Common Article 3 by United
States personnel a serious felony.34 So, the Court’s decision upped
the ante considerably for CIA military personnel involved in “alternative” interrogation techniques.35
Moreover, the fact that the Hamdan Court based its decision, at
least in part, on its interpretation of an international treaty raises
some very sticky questions about the ability of the political branches to
override the Court’s holding. While most (but not all) scholars would
agree that Congress has the authority to override the Court’s interpretation of Common Article 3 by abrogating the Geneva Conventions36—not a politically popular solution—there is far less agreement
about the effect of congressional actions that fall short of abrogation.
Suppose, for example, that Congress passed a statute purporting to
30. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796–97. Justice Alito, in his separate dissent, took issue with
this interpretation, arguing that the phrase “regularly constituted” should be interpreted
to require only that “the court be appointed or established in accordance with the appointing country’s domestic law.” Id. at 2850–51 (Alito, J., dissenting).
31. Hamdan Panel Discussion, supra note 13, at 18 (remarks of Carlos Vazquez); id. at
26–28 (remarks of David Luban).
32. Common Article 3, supra note 28, art. 3(1)(a).
33. Id. art. 3(1)(c).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); see also Hamdan Panel Discussion, supra note 13, at 26–27
(remarks of David Luban).
35. See Hamdan Panel Discussion, supra note 13, at 26–29 (remarks of David Luban).
The MCA attempts to erase some of these implications. It narrows the range of activities
that could constitute a violation of Common Article 3 for purposes of domestic law, including the War Crimes Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632–35 (2006).
The MCA also prevents any individual from invoking the Geneva Convention as a source of
rights in any habeas corpus or other civil action to which the United States or any of its
current or former officers are a party. Id. § 5, 120 Stat. at 2631–32.
36. See generally Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 334–35 (2005) (explaining that the last-in-time rule
permits an act of Congress to supersede a prior treaty).
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“reaffirm” the United States’ commitment to the Geneva Conventions,
but rejecting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Common Article
3 as applying to the conflict with al Qaeda.37 Would such a statute
override the Hamdan Court’s contrary determination under the lastin-time principle, or would it contravene the federal judiciary’s core
function of interpreting federal law? Chief Justice Roberts suggested
the latter view, albeit in a different context, in his recent opinion in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.38 As the Chief Justice put it: “If treaties are
to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining
their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one supreme
Court’ established by the Constitution.”39 Such statements suggest
that the Supreme Court may be reluctant to cede responsibility to the
political branches to determine how the United States will carry out its
treaty obligations.
Juxtaposing the majority’s analysis in Hamdan with the Court’s
2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld reinforces my conviction that
Hamdan represents an assertion of judicial authority as well as a pronouncement on the appropriate constitutional relationship between
Congress and the President. In Hamdi, a United States citizen captured during hostilities in Afghanistan challenged his detention as an
enemy combatant by military officials on United States soil.40 Unlike
in Hamdan, a majority of Justices agreed that Congress had authorized
the Executive to detain Hamdi for the duration of the relevant conflict.41 However, the Court went on to hold that the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required the
Government to provide Hamdi with “notice of the factual basis for his
classification” and a “fair opportunity” to challenge that classification
“before a neutral decisionmaker.”42 The Court arrived at this conclu37. The MCA arguably moves in this direction. It provides that “the President has the
authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”
§ 6(a)(3)(A), 120 Stat. at 2632.
38. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
39. Id. at 2684 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173, 177 (1803)).
Chief Justice Roberts also referred to the Court’s concomitant duty to interpret federal law.
See id. (“At the core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts’ independent responsibility—independent from its coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent
from the separate authority of the several States—to interpret federal law.” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment))).
40. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 521; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
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sion by applying the familiar balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge,43
which the Hamdi Court characterized as “[t]he ordinary mechanism
that we use for balancing . . . competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not
‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”44
Two aspects of the Hamdi Court’s reasoning seem particularly
noteworthy. First, the fact that Congress authorized Hamdi’s detention was not the end of the Court’s inquiry; rather, the Court had an
independent role to play in articulating the constitutionally required
procedures that would determine the continuing legality of that detention. Second, the test that the Court invoked to determine what
process was constitutionally due was the “ordinary” and quintessentially judicial task of weighing and balancing competing interests. To
be sure, the Court acknowledged that this judicial balance should take
into account the government’s “weighty and sensitive” national security interests,45 but it emphasized that those interests should be incorporated into the balancing process rather than provide a justification
for abandoning—or fundamentally altering—that process.46
Finally, Hamdan sheds some interesting light on the Court’s seminal decision in Youngstown, particularly on Justice Jackson’s wellknown concurring opinion. On the one hand, Hamdan affirms the
continued viability of Jackson’s three-part framework for resolving
separation of powers disputes concerning the scope of executive
power. Although it is Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion that relies
most explicitly on Jackson’s Youngstown framework, the structure of
Stevens’s majority opinion also incorporates Jackson’s most important
insight—that the constitutionality of executive action depends critically on the stance that Congress has taken toward the issue in question.47 This is significant because some recent, pre-Hamdan
scholarship had suggested that the Youngstown framework applied
only in the domestic context, and not to disputes involving foreign
affairs or war powers.48 The Hamdan Court went out of its way to re43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–29 (plurality opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532–35.
See Young, supra note 3, at 796–98.
See, e.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 63, 75 (2002) (noting that “[i]n the years since Youngstown, judicial pronouncements relating to the war powers have diminished to the point of being virtually nonexistent”); Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 78–80 (2000)
(discussing the view that Youngstown does not govern national security or foreign affairs
cases); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
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but this position by repeatedly noting that the Hamdan case could be
decided by reference to “ordinary” principles of constitutional and
statutory interpretation.49
On the other hand, Hamdan illustrates the limitations of the
Youngstown framework, particularly when considered in conjunction
with Hamdi. That is because, while Youngstown establishes that the legality of executive action turns largely on whether Congress has approved, disapproved, or remained silent with respect to that action,
Hamdan and Hamdi highlight the difficulty of determining which of
those courses Congress has taken. In both cases, the Justices splintered sharply on whether Congress had authorized or prohibited the
challenged executive action—a disagreement that would situate the
action in opposite tiers of the Jackson framework. Moreover, in both
cases, the disputing Justices emphasized different congressional enactments, further complicating the interpretive inquiry.
Thus, in Hamdi, a majority of the Court found that Congress had
“clearly and unmistakably” authorized Hamdi’s detention when it
passed a resolution—the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF)50—which empowered the President to use “all necessary and
appropriate force” against any person or entity that had “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” in the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.51 Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality, reasoned that it
was “of no moment” that the resolution did not specifically mention
detention, since “detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the
battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war.”52 Because the
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 352 (1986) (stating that Youngstown “is generally taken to be the dominant influence on the domestic front, while CurtissWright dominates with respect to foreign policy”); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, A
Comment on the Creation and Resolution of a “Nonproblem”: Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Foreign Affairs Power, and the Role of the Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1129, 1154 (1982) (stating that
“the Court’s action in Youngstown was seen as fitting only in a domestic power compartment of constitutional theory”). The reaction of many commentators at the time Youngstown was decided was even more dismissive. For example, one scholar placed the decision
in “the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.” Jerre
Williams, The Steel Seizure: A Legal Analysis of Political Controversy, 2 J. PUB. L. 29, 34 (1953)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting)). Another scholar claimed that the case was “destined to be ignored.” Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Steel Case: Presidential Responsibility and Judicial Irresponsibility, 6 W. POL. Q. 61, 65 (1953).
49. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006); id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part).
50. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp.
III 2003)).
51. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting
§ 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224); id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 519 (plurality opinion).
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AUMF authorized Hamdan’s detention, O’Connor reasoned that the
detention did not contravene a second relevant congressional enactment—the Non-Detention Act53—which provides that “[n]o citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”54
By contrast, Justices Souter and Ginsburg, concurring and dissenting in part, focused primarily on the strictures of the NonDetention Act, which the Justices found “has to be read broadly to
accord the statute a long reach and to impose a burden of justification
on the Government.”55 Such a broad interpretation was mandated,
Justice Souter explained, by the history and purpose of the Non-Detention Act, and by the “interpretive regime that subjected enactments limiting liberty in wartime to the requirement of a clear
statement.”56 The AUMF failed to satisfy this standard:
[The AUMF] never so much as uses the word detention, and
there is no reason to think Congress might have perceived
any need to augment Executive power to deal with dangerous citizens within the United States, given the well-stocked
statutory arsenal of defined criminal offenses covering the
gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to terrorists
might commit.57
Thus, according to Justice Souter, far from authorizing the President’s
actions—as the plurality had claimed—Congress had explicitly denied
the President the authority to detain Hamdi.
Hamdan involved a similar interpretive split, but with a majority of
Justices reaching the opposite conclusion on the question of congressional intent. The majority in Hamdan rejected the government’s
claim that Congress had authorized the military commissions created
53. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
54. 542 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)).
55. Id. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
56. Id. at 542–44.
57. Id. at 547. Justice Souter’s opinion also cited the subsequent passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act, which authorized detention of alien terrorists for up to seven days without
the commencement of criminal charges or removal proceedings. Id. at 551 (citing Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), 115
Stat. 272, 351 (2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (Supp. I 2001))). The specificity of
these provisions belied the Government’s reliance on implied powers in the AUMF, as
Justice Souter observed that “[i]t is very difficult to believe that the same Congress that
carefully circumscribed Executive power over alien terrorists on home soil would not have
meant to require the Government to justify clearly its detention of an American citizen
held on home soil incommunicado.” Id.
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by the President. Instead, five members of the Court determined that
the UCMJ explicitly contravened the authority claimed by the President. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by three other Justices,
placed the case in Justice Jackson’s third category—where the President acts in the face of congressional disapproval and his power is
therefore “at its lowest ebb.”58 Two dissenting Justices vigorously disagreed. They argued that congressional authorization for the President’s military commissions derived not only from the UCMJ itself,
“but also from the more recent, and broader, authorization contained
in the AUMF.”59 In the face of such congressional authorization, the
Court’s “duty to defer to the Executive’s military and foreign policy
judgment is at its zenith.”60
Thus, the disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Hamdan—like the disagreement between the plurality and the concurring Justices in Hamdi—turned largely on the Justices’ very different
views of what Congress had authorized. But neither the Youngstown
decision itself nor Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework provides the
tools to resolve this interpretive disagreement.61 Rather, that analysis
requires resort to all of the familiar—and contested—techniques of
statutory interpretation and administrative law, including judgments
about the type and amount of authority that Congress may delegate
and the extent to which the Court should defer to the Executive’s
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language.62 Moreover, the way
in which individual Justices deploy these interpretive tools is likely to
depend on their underlying theories and baseline assumptions about
the appropriate constitutional balance between executive and legisla58. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800–01, 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
59. Id. at 2825 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. See Katyal, supra note 1, at 99 (“Under Youngstown, whether a given case falls within
a particular zone depends on statutory construction. But the Court can toggle between
categories depending on its stinginess or generosity with any given statute and how it reads
legislative silence.”).
62. For example, scholars disagree about whether Congress may delegate greater authority to the Executive in foreign affairs than in domestic matters and whether courts
should give greater deference to the Executive’s interpretation of a statute in cases that
touch on foreign affairs. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86
VA. L. REV. 649, 680, 683 (2000) (suggesting that deference may apply “with special force”
to foreign affairs statutes), with id. at 650 & n.2, 664–65 (noting other commentators’ criticism of judicial deference to the Executive in foreign affairs matters), and Patricia L. Bellia,
Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 133 (2002) (“Nothing in
Justice Jackson’s discussion indicates whether courts should construe delegations in favor
of or against the Executive.”).

R
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tive authority—precisely the constitutional issue that the Youngstown
framework is supposed to resolve. Thus, to the extent that future separation of powers disputes about the scope of executive power turn on
the Court’s ability to discern congressional will, even a robust version
of Jackson’s tripartite framework offers precious little to guide the
Court’s inquiry.

